SCOTUS

8 posts

Does the Definition of Conception Really Matter?

After yesterday’s SCOTUS ruling in the matter of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., wherein the highest court in the land decided 5-4 that “closely held” for-profit corporations have a right to religiously object to government regulations (because Corporations Are People Too) with regard to the “contraceptive mandate” of the Affordable Care Act, it all really came down to conception and the process of. Continue reading

US Supreme Court Reasoning Slipping Away

scThe internets, how do they work?

The already ridiculously old and technologically impaired Supreme Court of the United States of America has come down with a bad case of link rot. The NY Times brings us news of a new study by the Harvard Law School that finds almost half of all hyperlinks referenced in Supreme Court decisions are now defunct. Now what the hell does that actually mean? Continue reading

Westboro Wins: A Look At The Supreme Court’s Decision

As previously reported, the Supreme Court decided Wednesday in favor of dismissing the monetary judgement against the Westboro Baptist Church. This piece is light on commentary and heavy on explanation, though, so it could be considered a complete failure. My hopes in writing this is to give some more specifics about the Court’s reasoning so as to encourage a good conversation about the decision.

What Happened?

In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court found that the hate speech near military funerals that lifted the Westboro Baptist Church into infamy is protected by the First Amendment. “As a nation we have chosen a different course – to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate,” Roberts wrote in his opinion for the Court. He was joined by Breyer, Kagan, Sotomayor, Thomas, Scalia, Kennedy, and Ginsburg, with Breyer writing a concurring opinion. Alito was the only dissenter.

For those not familiar with the case: U.S. Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder was killed in an accident in Iraq, and the Westboro Baptist Church picketed Matthew’s funeral with signs including the following: “America is doomed,” “You’re going to hell,” “God hates you,” “Fag troops,” “Semper fi fags” and “Thank God for dead soldiers.” Later, WBC posted on their website that Matthew’s death was because of how he was raised by his parents (as a Catholic), and that they taught him to defy God and raised him to be “for the devil.”  Matthew’s father sued Fred Phelps, the leader of WBC, two of Phelps’s daughters, and the church itself (collectively). In a jury trial, WBC was held liable for intrusion upon seclusion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy. Mr. Snyder was awarded $5 million.

The Phelps crew appealed, and the lower court verdict was overturned by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Mr. Snyder appealed to the Supreme Court, where the case came down to these issues: whether previous SCOTUS First Amendment decisions prohibiting the awarding of damages to public figures for the intentional infliction of emotional distress applies to this case (an issue that focuses on private parties/matters v. public parties/matters), and whether an individual attending a family member’s funeral constitutes a “captive audience” who is entitled to state protection from unwanted communication. The Court decided WBC’s favor on both questions.

Matters of Public Concern and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The Court was mostly concerned with the issue of “matters of public concern,” which the Court hasn’t really narrowly defined; however, the general rule is that speech is of public concern when it is of general interest, value and concern to the public, or when it’s “fairly considered” to be related to things concerning the community (including political and social matters). The fact that the speech is controversial or hurtful has no bearing on whether it is about matters of public concern. Looking at the content, context, and form of the speech, the Court determined that the speech was public, not private, in nature.

I thought this was a particularly interesting area of discussion, because the argument against this being of public concern was that some of the signs were specifically about Mr. Snyder’s son. However, Roberts wrote that just because some of the placards were related to a particular individual, the general and dominant theme of the demonstrations were about matters of concern; the placards addressed issues of public concern,  and Westboro was expressing its views on these matters. None of the placards were about Matthew, specifically, even though the context of picketing near his funeral made the placards appear to be more targeted at him at the time.

There was also a reasonable time, place and manner issue at play here, because the Court recognized that even protected speech is not granted the same degree of permissibility at all places and times. Unfortunately for Snyder, there was no law in effect that prohibited funeral picketing (and any law of that nature has to be content-neutral). The WBC protesters contacted the police prior to the demonstration, complied with police guidelines regarding where they could picket, and they were not unruly while demonstrating. The demonstration was held 1,000 feet from the church, under police supervision.

Now, one might argue that even using protected speech can be used to cause the intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), but the Court said that a jury cannot decided that the “outrageousness” of the picketing (‘outrageous’ being necessary for the state’s IIED law) overrides the special protections granted to speech on matters of public concern. If the picketing had disrupted the funeral, the outcome could have been different, but it was clear that the message, and not the protest itself, was the cause of the emotional distress. Furthermore, finding the WBC’s actions to be “outrageous” here is problematic. It’s clearly a subjective issue that the jury decides based on their own views, so when applying this standard to speech, there is a danger of using IIED to suppress expression that people might find abhorrent and disturbing. It comes down to a greater good principle: “in public debate [we] must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate ‘breathing space’ to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.” Thus, the Court dismissed the verdict for Mr. Snyder on IIED.

Intrusion Upon Seclusion, Civil Conspiracy, and Captive Audience

While the Fourth Circuit didn’t weigh the other two charges independently of IIED, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to do so. Mr. Snyder argues that even if the Phelpses were protected by the First Amendment, they were not protected from liability for intrusion upon seclusion because Mr. Snyder was a captive audience at Matthew’s funeral. The idea behind the captive audience doctrine is that, generally, the Constitution does not permit the government to decide what kinds of speech require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer–people who don’t want to see or hear things they find offensive have the burden of avoiding those things. The government can get involved if there is enough evidence that “substantial privacy interests are being invaded and in an essentially intolerable manner.” Examples of when SCOTUS has applied this doctrine include a case about a statute allowing a homeowner to restrict offensive mail from being delivered to his home, and a case involving an ordinance that prohibited picketing in front of or ‘about’ a person’s residence.

Here, the Court said found that WBC was “well away” from the funeral service. Mr. Snyder said that he could see just the tops of the placards when he was en route to the funeral, and there was no other indication that the picketing disrupted the actual service. Therefore, the captive audience doctrine does not apply, and the Court set aside the verdict on intrusion upon seclusion. Since the First Amendment protected WBC from not only IIED and intrusion upon seclusion in this matter, there is no basis for the claim of civil conspiracy, as the conspiracy relied upon the allegedly unlawful nature of WBC’s activity.

What This Means

Roberts stressed that this holding is narrow. First Amendment cases are very fact-dependent and complex, so the Court tries to tread delicately when reviewing them. Roberts agrees that WBC’s picketing is hurtful, and that it does not substantially contribute to the public discourse, but since WBC addressed matters of public import, did so on public property, carried out their protests in a peaceful manner that fully complies with the guidance of officials, and didn’t actually disrupt the funeral service, WBC’s speech in this matter is protected by the First Amendment.

The narrowness of this decision is extremely important here. I believe it is the totality of the situation that led to this outcome, which means that the decision could prove to be difficult to applied outward. Justice Breyer, in his written concurrence, pointed out that upholding the application of these tort laws in this circumstances would punish WBC for communicating its viewpoints on matters of public concern “without proportionately advancing the State’s interest in protecting its citizens against severe emotional harm.”

Problems With The Decision?

Justice Alito basically thinks the majority is nuts. He feels that WBC mixed protected speech with unprotected speech (specifically focusing on what was posted on WBC’s website that was specific to Matthew and his parents) and that the decision should have dealt with the two pieces separately, as often occurs in cases involved defamatory statements mixed with nondefamatory statements. Alito feels that WBC’s motivations–“to increase publicity for its views”–did not bring their attacks upon a public figure into contributory statements to a debate on matters of public concern.

Alito also feels that the public location argument is lacking, although I have to disagree with his reasoning on this one. “A physical assault may occur without trespassing; it is no defense that the perpetrator had “the right to be where [he was],” Alito wrote, and I think this analogy is unsuitable. The argument regarding the public location is not a standalone argument–it was combined with proximity. His analogy is inept because a physical assault requires a certain degree of proximity, whether it be to the assailant’s body or to the weapon used. It was established that Mr. Snyder was not able to see or hear anything that WBC was expressing at their location at the time of the service, so Mr. Snyder was not ‘assaulted’ by their speech; likewise, using Alito’s analogy, if person A were to angrily throw a baseball bat in person B’s general direction, and person B was significantly outside the range of impact, person A cannot be charged with the assault. Attempted assault, perhaps, but I do not believe attempted infliction of emotional distress actually exists (I could be wrong, though). The argument Alito appears to be making is that impact is impact, and verbal assaults on the conduct or character of Matthew should be treated like a physical assault when it comes to this matter. However, this circles back to the problem of finding sufficient evidence that the placards at the scene were specifically about Snyder. Since WBC uses those signs for pretty much every protest they stage, it’s a tough sell.

Alito stresses the importance of recognizing the special nature of funerals. He feels that IIED should cover this situation largely because of the significant impact and harm these actions caused, and could cause in the future, to the friends and family of the deceased. “Allowing family members to have a few hours of peace without harassment does not undermine public debate,” Alito wrote. “I would therefore hold that, in this setting,the First Amendment permits a private figure to recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by speech on a matter of private concern.”

The rest of his dissent addresses issues that were covered by the Fourth Circuit but not discussed by the majority’s decision. His discussion on those issues, along with the rest of the decision, can be found here.

What I Think

Personally, I’m torn. I am mostly in agreement with the majority, though I think perhaps it would be wise for states to make it much more difficult for people to picket near funerals. My biggest issue concerns the website entry, which, if not considered defamation, could and should be covered by IIED, I think. Alito discusses this in the part of his dissent I didn’t detail, but essentially the Fourth Circuit relied upon a couple of prior SCOTUS decisions, and I think perhaps they were not used appropriately. Specifically, the famous Hustler Magazine v. Falwell case, which involved claims of IIED and defamation. A number of differences were at play in the Hustler case, including Falwell being a public figure and the nature of the publication (a caricature, in this situation). The Court found that IIED could not be used to protect a public figure from hurtful speech, basically, because this would have a severe impact on satirists and the like, who often use embarrassing situations, certain “unfortunate physical traits,” etc. to discuss or criticize public figures. The Court felt that the falseness of the hurtful speech could not be separated from the IIED claim for public speakers because of these reason.

The Hustler decision, however, did not extend to private figures, and that’s the rub. Should it matter whether or not the statements made by WBC regarding Matthew and his parents can be proven to be false? The statements made cannot be proven either way because they are surrounded by the shroud of mystery that accompanies religion. Am I allowed to put up posters saying “God knows Person X is a rapist”? And why should the falseness of the statements matter, in terms of IIED? If I were to expose personal secrets of Person X in a highly public manner with the intention to inflict emotional distress, should Person X not be protected by that tort law? Justice Breyer, in his concurrence, does not believe that to be the case–that is, he thinks this decision does not preclude Person X from being protected. Then why is ‘demonstrably false’ an issue, and why should hyperbole matter when dealing with private figures? Honestly, I don’t know that the Court sufficiently dealt with this issue.

Wrapping Things Up

Westboro Baptist Church survives to see another day of hateful picketing and disgusting rhetoric. They probably see this as God’s way of letting them know they working on his behalf. I do have to say, though, that Fred Phelps is no fool: the single most powerful thing these guys have going for them is that they know the law, and they utilize this knowledge accordingly. They comply with all local laws regarding picketing and assembly. They notify local law enforcement. They are peaceful and nonviolent. They walk right up to the line and they set-up camp. I don’t remember how many lawyers are in the family, but here’s an idea of how well they know the law: one of their own, Margie Phelps, her family’s case in front of the Supreme Court.

Perhaps the lesson we could all learn from this is to start ignoring these people. They thrive off the attention they get. It validates them. It gives them the drive to do more. Counter-protests may work, depending on how they are done (nonsensical protests that drown them out/distract from them or protests that raise money to support the causes that WBC hates are a couple of examples that might have been effective, if I recall correctly), but the more people get angry at them for being so awful, the more they seem to appear. I knew about WBC a number of years ago, and there were never this prevalent (at least, I don’t remember them being anywhere near as well-known). I feel like not only has their coverage been increased, but also their appearances. Perhaps that’s just a perception issue, and I’m totally wrong, but since they are typically protected by the law, I think that it might be time to just try to snuff them out with silence–our silence.

I want to end this by saying that this was my takeaway from what I read of the decision. If there are any mistakes, please let me know and I will fix them. And if I’m totally off on my legal analysis in any way, please do let me know and I’ll try to either correct or clarify.

UPDATE: After this incident with Matthew’s funeral, Maryland passed a law requiring picketers to stay at least 100 feet away from a funeral or funeral precession. This law is content-neutral. However, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision on Wednesday, WBC plans to challenge this (and other) anti-picketing laws. I think the Phelps family might have a harder time with this case, and it’s probably more of a publicity stunt than anything else. Still, if they’d like to waste their money on it, that’s their prerogative.

In Defense Of The First Amendment

Our wonderful colleague Salome Valentine, hot on the heels of this week’s ruling in Snyder v. Phelps (holding WBC’s picketing of a military funeral to be Constitutionally-protected speech), highlighted an earlier decision by this Court dealing with a similar issue.  As correctly noted by her, in US v. Stevens, the Supreme Court struck down a 1999 law that outlawed “crush videos” – despicable videos that show the torment and death of animals whereby a (typically small) animal is crushed by a woman, done for the sexual (masturbatory) gratification.  I do not understand this fetish.  Few do and it appears to fall so far outside the bounds of ordinary human decency – and even depravity – that few are willing to discuss it in depth or at length.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court struck down a law that outlawed these videos, seeming to put the imprimatur of permissibility out conduct that falls well beyond the pale.  This is not true.  In fact, what Chief Justice John Roberts’ opinions in both Stevens and Snyder show is a deep abiding devotion to the letter and spirit of the First Amendment.  This devotion is apparent in the plain-spoken and highly accessible manner in which Justice Roberts wrote his opinions.

I have excerpted the notable and relevant portions of Roberts’ opinions.  Once you read them, I hope you will see that, at least when it comes to the First Amendment, John Roberts is a needed bulwark against the likes of Samuel Alito.  Where you see quotes, that is Justice Roberts citing to a prior case. I have omitted the cited case names and citations for brevity’s sake because Justice Roberts does, in fact, hew close to prior rulings:

Whether the First Amendment prohibits holding Westboro liable for its speech in this case turns largely  on whether that speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case. “[S]peech on ‘matters of public concern’ . . . is ‘at the  heart of the First Amendment’s protection.’” The First Amendment reflects “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”  That is because “speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.” Accordingly, “speech on public issues occupies the highest rung  of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection.”

The “content” of Westboro’s signs plainly relates to broad issues of interest to society at large, rather than matters of  “purely private concern.” While these messages may  fall short  of refined social or political commentary, the issues they highlight—the political and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the  military, and scandals involving the Catholic clergy—are matters of public import.  The signs certainly convey Westboro’s position on those issues,  in a manner designed… to reach as broad a public audience as possible.  And even if a few of  the signs—such as “You’re Going  to Hell” and “God  Hates You”—were viewed as containing messages related to Matthew Snyder or the Snyders specifically, that would not change the fact that the overall thrust and dominant theme of Westboro’s demonstration spoke to broader public issues.

Westboro had been actively engaged in speaking on the subjects addressed in its picketing long before it became aware of Matthew Snyder, and there can be no serious claim that Westboro’s picketing did not represent its “honestly believed” views on public issues. There was no preexisting relationship or conflict  between Westboro and Snyder that might suggest Westboro’s speech on public matters was intended to mask an attack on Snyder over a private matter.

Westboro conducted its picketing peacefully on matters of public concern at a public place adjacent to a public street.  Such space occupies a “special position in terms of First Amendment protection.” “[W]e have repeatedly referred to public streets as the archetype of a traditional public forum,” noting that “ ‘[t]ime out of mind’ public streets and sidewalks have been used for public assembly and debate.”

That said,  “[e]ven protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times.” Westboro’s choice of where and when to conduct its picketing is not beyond the Government’s regulatory reach—it is “subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions” that are consistent with the standards announced in this Court’s precedents.

Maryland’s law, however, was not  in effect at the time of the events at issue here,  so we have no occasion to consider how it might apply to facts such as those before us, or whether it or other similar regulations are constitutional.

Simply put, the church members had the right to be where they were.  Westboro alerted local authorities to its funeral protest and fully complied with police guidance on where the picketing could be staged.   The picketing was conducted  under police supervision some 1,000 feet from the church, out of the sight of those at the church.   The protest was not unruly; there was no shouting, profanity, or violence.

The record confirms that any  distress occasioned by Westboro’s picketing turned on the content and viewpointof the message conveyed, rather than any interference with the funeral itself.   A  group of parishioners standing at the very spot where Westboro stood, holding signs that said “God Bless America” and “God Loves You,” would not have been subjected to liability. It was  what Westboro said that exposed it to tort damages.

Given that Westboro’s speech was at a public place on a matter of public concern, that speech is entitled to “special protection” under the First Amendment.  Such speech cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.  “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” Indeed, “the point of all speech protection is to shield just those choices of content that in someone’s eyes are misguided, or even hurtful.”

“in public debate [we] must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate ‘breathing space’ to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.”

What Westboro said, in the whole context of how and where it chose to say it, is entitled to “special protection” under the First Amendment, and that protection cannot be overcome by a jury finding that the picketing was outrageous. For all these reasons, the jury  verdict imposing tort liability on Westboro for intentional infliction of emotional distress must be set aside.

In most circumstances, “the Constitution does not permit the government to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are  sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or  viewer. Rather, . . . the burden normally falls upon  the viewer  to avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes.”

As a general matter, we have applied the captive audience doctrine only sparingly to protect unwilling listeners from protected speech.  For  example, we have upheld  a statute allowing a homeowner to restrict the delivery of offensive mail to his home and an ordinance prohibiting picketing “before or about” any individual’s residence.

Here, Westboro stayed well away from the  memorial service.  Snyder could see no more than the tops of the signs when driving to the funeral.  And there is no indication that the picketing in any  way interfered with the funeral service itself.  We decline to expand the captive audience doctrine to the circumstances presented here. Because we find that the First Amendment bars Snyder from recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress or intrusion upon seclusion—the alleged unlawful activity Westboro conspired to accomplish—we must likewise hold that Snyder cannot recover for civil conspiracy based on those torts.

Our holding today is narrow.

Westboro believes that America is morally flawed; many Americans might feel  the same about Westboro.   Westboro’s funeral picketing is certainly hurtful and its contribution to public discourse may be negligible.   But Westboro addressed matters of public import on public property, in a peaceful manner, in full compliance with the guidance of local officials.  The speech was indeed planned to coincide with Matthew Snyder’s funeral, but did not itself disrupt that funeral, and Westboro’s choice to conduct its picketing at that time and place did not alter the nature of its speech.

Speech is powerful.  It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great pain.  On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker.   As  a Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect  even hurtful speech on  public issues to  ensure that we  do not stifle public debate.  That choice requires that we shield Westboro from tort liability for its picketing in this case.

From US v. Stevens:

“From 1791 to the present,” however, the First Amendment has “permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas,” and has never “include[d] a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.” These “historic and traditional categories long familiar to the bar,”  – including obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct —are “well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.

The Government argues that “depictions of animal cruelty” should be added to the list. It contends that depictions of “illegal acts of animal cruelty” that are “made, sold, or possessed for commercial gain” necessarily “lack expressive value,” and may accordingly “be regulated as unprotected speech.”  The claim is not just that Congress may regulate depictions of animal cruelty subject to the First Amendment, but that these depictions are outside the reach of that Amendment altogether— that they fall into a “`First Amendment Free Zone.'”

As the Government notes, the prohibition of animal cruelty itself has a long history in American law, starting with the early settlement of the Colonies. Reply Brief 12, n. 8; see, e.g., The Body of Liberties § 92 (Mass. Bay Colony 1641) (“No man shall exercise any Tirany or Cruelty towards any bruit Creature which are usually kept for man’s use“). But we are unaware of any similar tradition excluding depictions of animal cruelty from “the freedom of speech” codified in the First Amendment, and the Government points us to none.

Instead, the Government points to Congress’s “`legislative judgment that . . . depictions of animals being intentionally tortured and killed [are] of such minimal redeeming value as to render [them] unworthy of First Amendment protection,'” and asks the Court to uphold the ban on the same basis. The Government thus proposes that a claim of categorical exclusion should be considered under a simple balancing test: “Whether a given category of speech enjoys First Amendment protection depends upon a categorical balancing of the value of the speech against its societal costs.”

As a free-floating test for First Amendment coverage, that sentence is startling and dangerous. The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it. The Constitution is not a document “prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 178, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).

We read § 48 to create a criminal prohibition of alarming breadth. To begin with, the text of the statute’s ban on a “depiction of animal cruelty” nowhere requires that the depicted conduct be cruel. That text applies to “any . . . depiction” in which “a living animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed.” § 48(c)(1). “[M]aimed, mutilated, [and] tortured” convey cruelty, but “wounded” or “killed” do not suggest any such limitation.

The only thing standing between defendants who sell such depictions and five years in federal prison—other than the mercy of a prosecutor—is the statute’s exceptions clause. Subsection (b) exempts from prohibition “any depiction that has serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value.” The Government argues that this clause substantially narrows the statute’s reach: News reports about animal cruelty have “journalistic” value; pictures of bullfights in Spain have “historical” value; and instructional hunting videos have “educational” value.

Quite apart from the requirement of “serious” value in § 48(b), the excepted speech must also fall within one of the enumerated categories. Much speech does not. Most hunting videos, for example, are not obviously instructional in nature, except in the sense that all life is a lesson. According to Safari Club International and the Congressional Sportsmen’s Foundation, many popular videos “have primarily entertainment value” and are designed to “entertai[n] the viewer, marke[t] hunting equipment, or increas[e] the hunting community.” The Government offers no principled explanation why these depictions of hunting or depictions of Spanish bullfights would be inherently valuable while those of Japanese dogfights are not. The dissent contends that hunting depictions must have serious value because hunting has serious value, in a way that dogfights presumably do not. Post, at ___-___. But § 48(b) addresses the value of the depictions, not of the underlying activity. There is simply no adequate reading of the exceptions clause that results in the statute’s banning only the depictions the Government would like to ban.

This prosecution is itself evidence of the danger in putting faith in government representations of prosecutorial restraint. When this legislation was enacted, the Executive Branch announced that it would interpret § 48 as covering only depictions “of wanton cruelty to animals designed to appeal to a prurient interest in sex.” See Statement by President William J. Clinton upon Signing H.R. 1887, 34 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2557 (Dec. 9, 1999). No one suggests that the videos in this case fit that description. The Government’s assurance that it will apply § 48 far more restrictively than its language provides is pertinent only as an implicit acknowledgment of the potential constitutional problems with a more natural reading.

Again, in Stevens, Justice Alito was the lone dissent.

Does the Supreme Court love or even approve of animal cruelty or the needless infliction of emotional anguish on a grieving parent?  Not one jot.   What Justice Stevens’ opinion show is compassion and desire for a moral society in America that is governed equally before the law.

Please read these opinions if you get a chance. They are written in plain English and speak volumes to just how valuable the First Amendment is.  I find myself revisiting my prejudices towards Justice Roberts, based on him being appointed by President George W. Bush.  In reading these two cases, I am glad to see that someone of his intellect is, in fact, safeguarding the First Amendment.