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SCOTUS October Term 2012 Decision Watch (Updated 6/26)

There were 77 cases argued before the US Supreme Court in the 2012 October Term. The Court announced the decisions in the last 3 cases on June 26th.

6/26 Update: The Court announced decisions in the highly-anticipated same-sex marriage cases, which are:

  • Hollingsworth v. Perry (same-sex marriage: Prop. 8) (5-4, Thomas, Alito, Kennedy and Sotomayor dissent): Prop. 8 is a voted-on provision in California which defines marriage as between a man and a woman. Two same-sex couples, represented by legal odd couple David Boies and Theodore Olson, sued, claiming that defining marriage as only between heterosexual couples would deny same-sex couples equal protection under the law as required under the 14th Amendment. The Court held that the Prop. 8 proponents had insufficient personal interests to bring the case (lack of standing). Because they could not bring the case to court, the US Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit cannot rule on the case. The US District Court’s injunction prohibiting enforcement of Prop. 8 stands, because the California state government, which was affected by the law because it has to enforce it, was a party in that case and was named in the injunction. TL;DR: Same-sex couples can marry in California.
  • United States v. Windsor (same-sex marriage: DOMA) (5-4, Roberts, Scalia, Thomas and Alito dissent): Marriages are governed by state law, meaning that each state decides for itself who can marry and what the procedures are for marriage. However, Section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) requires that the federal government only recognize marriages between heterosexual couples for federal programs. In this case, a woman had to pay higher federal estate taxes than other married couples even though she was considered married in New York – this was because she was married to a woman and therefore could not claim a spousal deduction under federal tax law. The Court held that Section 3 is unconstitutional because it treats couples in same-sex marriages differently from those in heterosexual marriages. This ruling affects many and various laws involving married couples, including tax, immigration and employee benefits. It is unclear (1) what the Court used as a standard of review to determine the unconstitutionality of Section 3 and (2) how this would affect the application of federal laws in various situations – for example, when a same-sex couple marries in one state but resides in another state that does not recognize same-sex marriages.

The other case was Sekhar v. United States, where the Court unanimously held that an attorney’s one-time “recommendation” is not considered “property” under federal extortion laws (Hobbs Act).

6/25 Update: The Court announced decisions on the following 3 cases:

  • Shelby County, AL v. Holder, Atty Gen. (voting rights) (5-4, Ginsberg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan dissent): Section 5 of the federal Voting Rights Act requires jurisdictions with a history of voting problems to “pre-clear” any changes in voting laws and procedures with the federal government. Several covered jurisdictions sued, claiming that the requirements were unnecessary and burdensome. The Court “made no ruling on Section 5” but held that Section 4, which established a formula to determine which jurisdictions would be subject to the pre-clearance requirements under Section 5, was unconstitutional. The Chief Justice’s opinion stated that the coverage formula “is based on decades-old data and eradicated practices” and that “Congress may draft another formula based on current conditions.” This means that the Court did not technically overturn the Voting Rights Act but made it unusable in practice.
  • Koontz v. St. Johns River Mgmt. (5-4, Kagan, Ginsberg, Breyer and Sotomayor dissent): The Court held that a state land use agency’s refusal to grant permits for a landowner – where the landowner refused to comply with permit conditions that had nothing to do with the landowner’s plans for the property – would constitute the agency’s “taking” of the landowner’s property; permit requirements must comply with legal nexus and proportionality tests. This is a pro-property/business owner decision.
  • Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl (the Baby Veronica case) (5-4, Scalia, Sotomayor, Ginsberg and Kagan dissent): An unmarried couple, a Native American (NA) man and a non-NA woman, have a baby and break up. The biological father had not taken steps under state law to establish paternity (most states require that a man who has fathered a child when not married take legal paternity; paternity is not presumed as with married couples), never had custody of the child and even unwittingly signed a form relinquishing his parental rights. The biological father finds out about the adoption and tries to block it under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The father claims that (1) he did not meet the ICWA’s high standard for terminating his parental rights and (2) the adoptive family did not make an effort to prevent the breakup of an NA family as required by the law. The Court held that even if the biological father is considered a parent under the ICWA, the two issues did not bar the termination of his parental rights as he never had custody of the child in the first place.

6/24 Update: The Court announced decisions on the following 5 cases:

  • Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (affirmative action) (7-1, Ginsberg dissent, vacated and remanded): Abigail Fisher had sued the University of Texas, claiming that she was rejected by the school because she is white. The Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s opinion and sent the case back to be retried (remanded) because the Fifth Circuit did not use the proper standard (strict scrutiny) in analyzing the case. Although the Court did not tear down affirmative action, it held that the university must prove that its admissions program is narrowly tailored to create a diverse student body, of which race/ethnicity is but one (important) element. The Court also stated that “the reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversity.” (Translation: The case is being sent back to the lower court; affirmative action still lives.)
  • Univ. of TX Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar (5-4, Ginsberg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan dissent): Under a federal employment discrimination law (Title VII), an employee who claims that the employer retaliated against him/her must prove that the employer would not have acted against the employee but for a discriminatory reason. This opinion favors employers because it creates more stringent standards for filing and winning a retaliation claim.
  • Vance v. Ball State University (5-4, Ginsberg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan dissent): Under federal law, an employer is automatically liable (vicarious liability) for workplace harassment if a supervisor harasses an employee. The Court holds that under federal law (Title VII), a supervisor is defined as someone allowed by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the employee. Like Univ. of TX Southwestern Med Ctr. v. Nassar, this opinion favors employers because it creates more stringent standards for aggrieved employees to prove their case.
  • United States v. Kebodeaux (7-2, Scalia and Thomas dissent): An individual was convicted and served the punishment of a sex crime before the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) was enacted. Before SORNA, sex offenders were not required to register as sex offenders but were penalized if they did not do so. The Court held that this individual’s conviction for failure to register as a sex offender under SORNA was constitutional.
  • Mutual Pharmaceutical v. Bartlett (5-4, Breyer, Kagan, Sotomayor and Ginsberg dissent): The Court held that federal law preempts an individual’s right to sue a drug company for design deficits of genetic pharmaceutical products in state court.

Photo via Flickr.

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